Le président Bush rend public le rapport sur les "tendances du terrorisme mondial"
LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 27.09.06 | 08h49
Les conséquences de la guerre en Irak pour la "guerre contre le terrorisme" ont déclenché, mardi 26 septembre, une vive polémique entre le président américain et l'opposition démocrate, à six semaines d'élections parlementaires aux Etats-Unis. George W. Bush s'en est une nouvelle fois pris avec colère aux médias et à leurs informateurs, coupables de divulguer des informations confidentielles "pour des motifs politiques", dans le but de "créer la confusion dans l'esprit des Américains".
"Pour couper court aux spéculations", il a contre-attaqué en publiant les "principales conclusions" d'un rapport confidentiel élaboré par seize agences du renseignement, dont certaines avaient déjà été décrites par le New York Times et le Washington Post.
"Le conflit irakien est devenu une 'cause célèbre' pour les djihadistes" et "le djihad en Irak façonne une nouvelle génération de dirigeants et d'agents terroristes", peut-on lire dans ce rapport, intitulé "Tendances du terrorisme mondial : implications pour les Etats-Unis". En pleine campagne électorale, cette assertion a de quoi réjouir l'opposition démocrate, qui ne cesse de dénoncer la conduite de la guerre en Irak et d'accuser l'administration d'"induire en erreur" l'opinion publique."Comme je le dis depuis pas mal de temps, la guerre en Irak nous a rendus moins en sécurité", a ainsi déclaré le sénateur John Rockefeller.
Mais cette synthèse du renseignement donne aussi des arguments à l'administration Bush, qui assure qu'un retrait prématuré d'Irak reviendrait à offrir la victoires aux terroristes."S'il y avait une perception de victoire djihadiste [en Irak], cela inspirerait plus de combattants à poursuivre la lutte ailleurs", estiment les services de renseignement. A contrario, "si les djihadistes avaient l'impression et donnaient l'impression, en quittant l'Irak, d'avoir échoué, nous pensons que moins de combattants seront tentés de poursuivre la lutte."
Ces conclusions, sur quatre pages, ne représentent qu'un extrait d'un rapport confidentiel finalisé en avril. Elles ont immédiatement été exploitées par la majorité républicaine.
Elles confirment que "le succès américain en Irak est la clé pour faire en sorte que la menace terroriste ne grandisse pas. La confusion que les démocrates espèrent entretenir révèle tout ce qu'il faut savoir sur leur incapacité à formuler une vraie" politique de sécurité, a asséné le chef de la majorité à la Chambre des représentants, John Boehner.
L'opposition, qui avait réclamé de "connaître toute l'histoire" sur ce rapport, avait dénoncé à l'avance une publication seulement partielle du document. "La dernière chose qu'il nous faut, c'est une publication sélective de certaines parties du rapport, dans une tentative désespérée de l'administration d'éviter de révéler la vérité", avait souligné le sénateur Edward Kennedy.
UNE DEUXIÈME NOTE "À L'ÉTAT DE BROUILLON"
La polémique a pris d'autant plus de relief que le scrutin du 7 novembre – qui risque de coûter sa majorité à Bush – se joue largement sur les perceptions de la guerre en Irak – impopulaire – et de la politique antiterroriste – un point fort de l'administration Bush et de sa majorité. Elle risque de se prolonger si, comme l'affirme une élue démocrate, Jane Harman, le rapport divulgué mardi en cache un autre.
D'après Mme Harman, numéro deux de la commission du renseignement à la Chambre des représentants, l'administration bloque en effet délibérément une synthèse des services de renseignement spécifiquement consacrée à l'Irak. Selon l'élue, cette deuxième synthèse a été "laissée à l'état de brouillon", et donc non communiquée aux parlementaires. "Parce que certains de nos responsables ne veulent pas que nous la voyions avant les élections", a-t-elle précisé. _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова
The New York Times Backing Policy, President Issues Terror Estimate
Published: September 27, 2006
WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 — Portions of a National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism that the White House released under pressure on Tuesday said that Muslim jihadists were “increasing in both number and geographic dispersion” and that current trends could lead to increasing attacks around the globe.
The report, a comprehensive assessment of terrorism produced in April by American intelligence agencies, said the invasion and occupation of Iraq had become a “cause célèbre” for jihadists. It identified the jihad in Iraq as one of four underlying factors fueling the spread of the Islamic radicalism, along with entrenched grievances, the slow pace of reform and pervasive anti-American sentiment.
The intelligence estimate said American-led counterterrorism efforts in the past five years had “seriously damaged the leadership of Al Qaeda and disrupted its operations.” But it said that Al Qaeda continued to pose the greatest threat to American interests among terrorism organizations, and that the global jihadist movement overall was “spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.”
The estimate predicted that over the next five years the factors fueling the spread of global jihad were likely to be more powerful than those that might slow it.
The White House ordered portions of the intelligence estimate declassified to counter what it described as mischaracterizations about its findings in news reports.
The Bush administration had initially resisted releasing the document but changed course after being pressured to declassify the report by Republicans, including Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, and by the conservative editorial page of The Wall Street Journal.
At a news conference on Tuesday where he announced the release of portions of the document, President Bush suggested forcefully that news reports in the past two days about the document had been based on politically motivated leaks.
“You know, to suggest that if we weren’t in Iraq we would see a rosier scenario, with fewer extremists joining the radical movement, requires us to ignore 20 years of experience,” Mr. Bush said. He added: “My judgment is: The only way to protect this country is to stay on the offense.”
The intelligence estimate says that if jihadists who leave Iraq perceive themselves, or are perceived by others, to have failed, fewer fighters will be inspired to keep fighting.
Democrats seized on the document’s conclusions as proof that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.
“The war in Iraq has made us less safe,” said Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, the top Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee. Mr. Rockefeller said the judgments contained in the intelligence estimate “make it clear that the intelligence community — all 16 agencies — believe the war in Iraq has fueled terrorism.”
The estimate was the first formal appraisal of the terrorism threat by American intelligence agencies since the invasion of Iraq began in March 2003. The public release of any portion of such a document is highly unusual. The White House declassified fewer than 4 pages of what officials described as a document of more than 30 pages, saying that to release more of it would endanger intelligence sources and methods.
The release of the findings added fuel to an intense political debate about the administration’s record in combating terrorism. Mr. Bush used the news conference to reassert his view that the Iraq war was not to blame for the growth of Islamic radicalism.
He also attributed the disclosure of some of the assessment findings to what he said were government officials leaking classified information to “create confusion in the minds of the American people” weeks before an important Congressional election.
The first article on the findings was published Sunday in The New York Times after more than five weeks of reporting. More than a dozen United States government officials and outside experts were interviewed for the article, including employees of several government agencies and both supporters and critics of the Bush administration.
Democrats also criticized the White House for only declassifying part of the report, and the House minority leader, Nancy Pelosi of California, tried and failed to persuade Republicans to agree to a vote that would have shut the doors of the House of Representatives to allow members to read the entire classified report.
Officials who have read the entire document said the still-classified portion contained a more detailed analysis of the impact of the Iraq war on the global jihad movement. Representative Jane Harman of California, the top Democrat on the House intelligence committee, said that what the White House released Tuesday was broadly consistent with the classified portion of the report.
National intelligence estimates are the most authoritative documents that American intelligence agencies produce on a specific national security issue. They represent the consensus view of the 16 intelligence agencies in government, and are approved by John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence.
The release on Tuesday of portions of the document was the second time that the Bush administration had come under political pressure to declassify a national intelligence estimate.
In July 2003, the White House released the principal judgments of an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate about Iraq’s weapons programs in an attempt to address a furor over the origins of President Bush’s statement, made in a State of the Union address, that Saddam Hussein had been trying to buy nuclear materials in Niger.
In recent months, without disclosing the existence of the intelligence estimate on terrorism, some senior American intelligence officials have given glimpses into its conclusions. During a speech in San Antonio in April, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, who was then Mr. Negroponte’s deputy, said new jihadist networks and cells were increasingly likely to emerge.
“If this trend continues, threats to the U.S. at home and abroad will become more diverse and that could lead to increasing attacks worldwide,” General Hayden said, using the exact language of the intelligence assessment made public on Tuesday. General Hayden is now director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
But the intelligence assessment paints a starker picture of the role that the Iraq war is playing in shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders than that presented either in recent White House documents or in speeches by President Bush tied to the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks.
The intelligence report specifically cited the role of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led the Iraqi group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, in attracting new recruits for the jihad cause in Iraq, and stated that “should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.”
He was killed by American forces in June.
Frances Fragos Townsend, the president’s homeland security adviser, suggested to reporters on Tuesday that the killing of Mr. Zarqawi might ultimately help dampen the appeal of jihad in Iraq.
At the same time, the report concludes that the increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia “might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.”
To be successful in combating the spread of a radical ideology, the assessment states, the United States government “must go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.” _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова
By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 27, 2006; Page A21
In announcing yesterday that he would release the key judgments of a controversial National Intelligence Estimate, President Bush said he agreed with the document's conclusion "that because of our successes against the leadership of al-Qaeda, the enemy is becoming more diffuse and independent."
But the estimate itself posits no such cause and effect. Instead, while it notes that counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged and disrupted al-Qaeda's leadership, it describes the spreading "global jihadist movement" as fueled largely by forces that al-Qaeda exploits but is not actively directing. They include Iraq, corrupt and unjust governments in Muslim-majority countries, and "pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims."
The overall estimate is bleak, with minor notes of optimism. It depicts a movement that is likely to grow more quickly than the West's ability to counter it over the next five years, as the Iraq war continues to breed "deep resentment" throughout the Muslim world, shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and cultivating new supporters for their ideology.
In describing Iraq as "the 'cause celebre' for jihadists," the document judges that real and perceived insurgent successes there will "inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere," while losses would have the opposite effect. It predicts that the elimination of al-Qaeda leaders, particularly Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed after the estimate was completed in April, would probably leave that organization splintered into disparate groups that "for at least a time, pose a less serious threat to U.S. interests" than the current al-Qaeda structure.
On the relative bright side, the assessment notes the unpopularity with "the vast majority of Muslims" of the jihadists' brutal tactics and ultraconservative ideology. Democratic reforms and peaceful political alternatives in Muslim countries will also counter terrorist aims, it says.
But "the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this estimate," the report notes. An intelligence official who was not authorized to speak on the record said the time frame is until early 2011.
The key judgments released yesterday made up slightly more than three pages of a much longer document that includes supporting background information. The judgments were intact except for what the official called "a small amount, and I emphasize small, of sensitive text" that was removed "to protect sources or address sensitivities" of allied intelligence agencies, or to "protect tactical recommendations that could become a part of future policy actions."
"What you're seeing here is really the key judgments," the official said.
Descriptions of the unseen document in media reports last weekend quoted intelligence officials as saying it described a global terrorist threat that was worsening as a result of the Iraq war. The reports led to an explosion of reaction, with the Bush administration and leading congressional Republicans saying that the published portions did not reflect the document's balanced view of successes and remaining challenges. It was no accident, Bush charged, that selective and potentially damaging parts had been "leaked" on the eve of the midterm elections.
Democrats, sensing advantage, contended that the administration had withheld a negative assessment for political reasons and demanded its release. The clamor apparently led Bush, in a meeting yesterday with Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, to authorize publication of the judgments.
Democratic claims of an administration coverup seemed less justified yesterday as it became apparent that the complete classified report had been made available to lawmakers within days of its completion in April.
Copies of the NIE were sent to the House and Senate intelligence, armed services and foreign affairs committees at the time, through normal electronic information channels available to all members, intelligence and congressional sources said. It arrived at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on April 26.
In the House, "there was a bit of a snafu with this particular document," said a spokesman for Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), the intelligence committee chairman. "We had a massive computer failure on our classified side." The first that the committee knew of its existence was late last week, when "it was requested specifically by a member. That was when it was found and scanned into our system."
Whether the document was ignored or disappeared into cyberspace, however, it seemed to have made little impact on Capitol Hill at the time. No one in either chamber, on either side of the aisle, requested a briefing or any further information on its conclusions until now, the sources said.
The intelligence community has had its own problems with the attention the document is now receiving. Several active and retired intelligence officials stressed that the judgments were nothing new and followed a series of similar assessments made since early 2003 about the impact of the Iraq war on global terrorism.
"This is very much mainstream stuff," said Paul R. Pillar, the CIA's national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005. "There are no surprises."
Several active and retired intelligence officials, who were not authorized to speak on behalf of the intelligence community, expressed resentment at the administration's decision to have Negroponte issue the first official reaction to the weekend reports. They said he should not have become involved in what quickly became a political battle. _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова
Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate .
Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States. dated April 2006
United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.
Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.
If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida, could erode support for the jihadists.
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.
The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.
The Iraq conflict has become the .cause celebre. for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.
We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.
Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq .jihad;. (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims.all of which jihadists exploit.
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists. radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
The jihadists. greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution.an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari.a-based governance spanning the Muslim world.is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists. Propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.
If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit. Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.
The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa.ida.
Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.
The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa.ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations. Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al- Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-Qa.ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional or global ones. We judge that most jihadist groups.both well-known and newly formed.will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.
CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.
While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists. Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.
We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support. _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова
Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat
Article Tools Sponsored By
By MARK MAZZETTI
Published: September 24, 2006
WASHINGTON, Sept. 23 — A stark assessment of terrorism trends by American intelligence agencies has found that the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism and that the overall terrorist threat has grown since the Sept. 11 attacks.
The classified National Intelligence Estimate attributes a more direct role to the Iraq war in fueling radicalism than that presented either in recent White House documents or in a report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee, according to several officials in Washington involved in preparing the assessment or who have read the final document.
The intelligence estimate, completed in April, is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism by United States intelligence agencies since the Iraq war began, and represents a consensus view of the 16 disparate spy services inside government. Titled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,’’ it asserts that Islamic radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread across the globe.
An opening section of the report, “Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement,” cites the Iraq war as a reason for the diffusion of jihad ideology.
The report “says that the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse,” said one American intelligence official.
More than a dozen United States government officials and outside experts were interviewed for this article, and all spoke only on condition of anonymity because they were discussing a classified intelligence document. The officials included employees of several government agencies, and both supporters and critics of the Bush administration. All of those interviewed had either seen the final version of the document or participated in the creation of earlier drafts. These officials discussed some of the document’s general conclusions but not details, which remain highly classified.
Officials with knowledge of the intelligence estimate said it avoided specific judgments about the likelihood that terrorists would once again strike on United States soil. The relationship between the Iraq war and terrorism, and the question of whether the United States is safer, have been subjects of persistent debate since the war began in 2003.
National Intelligence Estimates are the most authoritative documents that the intelligence community produces on a specific national security issue, and are approved by John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence. Their conclusions are based on analysis of raw intelligence collected by all of the spy agencies.
Analysts began working on the estimate in 2004, but it was not finalized until this year. Part of the reason was that some government officials were unhappy with the structure and focus of earlier versions of the document, according to officials involved in the discussion.
Previous drafts described actions by the United States government that were determined to have stoked the jihad movement, like the indefinite detention of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, and some policy makers argued that the intelligence estimate should be more focused on specific steps to mitigate the terror threat. It is unclear whether the final draft of the intelligence estimate criticizes individual policies of the United States, but intelligence officials involved in preparing the document said its conclusions were not softened or massaged for political purposes.
Frederick Jones, a White House spokesman, said the White House “played no role in drafting or reviewing the judgments expressed in the National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism.” The estimate’s judgments confirm some predictions of a National Intelligence Council report completed in January 2003, two months before the Iraq invasion. That report stated that the approaching war had the potential to increase support for political Islam worldwide and could increase support for some terrorist objectives.
Documents released by the White House timed to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks emphasized the successes that the United States had made in dismantling the top tier of Al Qaeda.
“Since the Sept. 11 attacks, America and its allies are safer, but we are not yet safe,” concludes one, a report titled “9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges.” “We have done much to degrade Al Qaeda and its affiliates and to undercut the perceived legitimacy of terrorism.”
That document makes only passing mention of the impact the Iraq war has had on the global jihad movement. “The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry,” it states.
The report mentions the possibility that Islamic militants who fought in Iraq could return to their home countries, “exacerbating domestic conflicts or fomenting radical ideologies.”
On Wednesday, the Republican-controlled House Intelligence Committee released a more ominous report about the terrorist threat. That assessment, based entirely on unclassified documents, details a growing jihad movement and says, “Al Qaeda leaders wait patiently for the right opportunity to attack.”
The new National Intelligence Estimate was overseen by David B. Low, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats, who commissioned it in 2004 after he took up his post at the National Intelligence Council. Mr. Low declined to be interviewed for this article.
The estimate concludes that the radical Islamic movement has expanded from a core of Qaeda operatives and affiliated groups to include a new class of “self-generating” cells inspired by Al Qaeda’s leadership but without any direct connection to Osama bin Laden or his top lieutenants.
It also examines how the Internet has helped spread jihadist ideology, and how cyberspace has become a haven for terrorist operatives who no longer have geographical refuges in countries like Afghanistan.
In early 2005, the National Intelligence Council released a study concluding that Iraq had become the primary training ground for the next generation of terrorists, and that veterans of the Iraq war might ultimately overtake Al Qaeda’s current leadership in the constellation of the global jihad leadership.
But the new intelligence estimate is the first report since the war began to present a comprehensive picture about the trends in global terrorism.
In recent months, some senior American intelligence officials have offered glimpses into the estimate’s conclusions in public speeches.
“New jihadist networks and cells, sometimes united by little more than their anti-Western agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge,” said Gen. Michael V. Hayden, during a speech in San Antonio in April, the month that the new estimate was completed. “If this trend continues, threats to the U.S. at home and abroad will become more diverse and that could lead to increasing attacks worldwide,” said the general, who was then Mr. Negroponte’s top deputy and is now director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
For more than two years, there has been tension between the Bush administration and American spy agencies over the violence in Iraq and the prospects for a stable democracy in the country. Some intelligence officials have said the White House has consistently presented a more optimistic picture of the situation in Iraq than justified by intelligence reports from the field.
Spy agencies usually produce several national intelligence estimates each year on a variety of subjects. The most controversial of these in recent years was an October 2002 document assessing Iraq’s illicit weapons programs. Several government investigations have discredited that report, and the intelligence community is overhauling how it analyzes data, largely as a result of those investigations.
The broad judgments of the new intelligence estimate are consistent with assessments of global terrorist threats by American allies and independent terrorism experts.
The panel investigating the London terrorist bombings of July 2005 reported in May that the leaders of Britain’s domestic and international intelligence services, MI5 and MI6, “emphasized to the committee the growing scale of the Islamist terrorist threat.”
More recently, the Council on Global Terrorism, an independent research group of respected terrorism experts, assigned a grade of “D+” to United States efforts over the past five years to combat Islamic extremism. The council concluded that “there is every sign that radicalization in the Muslim world is spreading rather than shrinking.” _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова
Al-Qaida joue "un rôle central" en Irak, selon l'ONU
LE MONDE | 28.09.06 | 14h28
Un rapport de l'ONU, publié mercredi 27 septembre, parvient aux mêmes conclusions que celles des agences de renseignement américaines, dont le président George Bush avait dû autoriser une déclassification partielle du rapport la veille : l'Irak est devenu "un excellent terrain d'entraînement" pour Al-Qaida et cette guerre renforce le mouvement islamiste armé.
Selon ce rapport, rédigé par le Comité de l'ONU sur les activités d'Al-Qaida et des talibans, "de nouveaux engins explosifs sont maintenant utilisés en Afghanistan, dans le mois qui suit leur première apparition en Irak. Et, bien que l'on n'ait pas encore vu de talibans combattre ailleurs qu'en Afghanistan ou au Pakistan, selon certaines informations, certains suivraient un entraînement en Irak et en Somalie".
PIC DES ATTENTATS-SUICIDES
"La violence s'est considérablement intensifiée en Afghanistan et n'a pas diminué en Irak, où la part de violence imputable à Al-Qaida reste disproportionnée par rapport à ses effectifs, poursuit le rapport. Al-Qaida joue un rôle central dans les combats et a encouragé la montée de la violence sectaire (en Irak)."
"Le nombre d'attentats-suicides au cours de la dernière semaine a été le plus élevé" depuis le début de la guerre en Irak, en mars 2003, a par ailleurs déclaré, mercredi, le général américain William Caldwell, porte-parole de la Force multinationale menée par les Etats-Unis. "La moitié d'entre eux ont visé les services de sécurité" américains et irakiens, a-t-il précisé. - (AFP, Reuters.) _________________ A la guerre comme a la guerre или вторая редакция Забугорнова